635 of Sikang, which rounded out the western part of the Southwest Region, began to be developed as a part of the frontier colonial territory during the last years of the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644-1912).

635 669 563 When the Red Army overran the Southwest Region in 1949, the Communists fell heir to the problems the territory has posed to every governing authority in China. As had often happened in the past, the mountainous terrain of the Southwest Region was the last refuge of armed resistance to the new regime. According to the Communists, Kweichow was not completely in their hands until January 1951,[1] and more "bandits" (a common Communist term for its armed enemies) were found in the Southwest Region than in any other region.[2] A more difficult and longer-term problem was that of the tribal people who had never been assimilated into Chinese culture. Constituting about 20 per cent of the region's population, the autochthonous people in many areas of the Southwest were still organized under their own tribal laws and respected the authority only of their own tribal chiefs.

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1. Survey of the China Mainland Press, Hong Kong, American Consulate General, 205, pp. 12-13. Hereafter cited as S.C.M.P. Unless specifically attributed to the American editors, citations from this source refer to literal translations from Communist magazines and newspapers and should be evaluated accordingly.

2. Ibid., 212, p. 24.

D. Conflict between Tribesmen and Han Chinese

175 167 563 The mass migration of Han Chinese into the Southwest Region and the attempts of the central government to increase its real control there resulted in heightened and continual conflict between tribesmen on the one hand and the new settlers and the Chinese government on the other. Even if the intrusion of the central authority did not bring with its exploitive and corrupt government, the influx of settlers encroached on the domain of the tribesmen to threaten their livelihood and the power of the local ruler.

175 669 563 Oppression and misgovernment by the Han Chinese bureaucracy, along with appropriation of former tribal lands by Chinese agriculturists drove the Miao people of Kweichow into desperate acts of violence twice in the eighteenth century. A great outbreak in 1735 was put down with much bloodshed by an army under General Chang Kuang-ssu. After enduring another half-century of misgovernment and exploitation, the Miao people retreated to the deeper mountain recesses of the province and again attempted rebellion under the leadership of Wu Pa-yüeh in 1795. In the next two years, the tribesmen sacked Chinese cities and towns in Kweichow, Szechwan, and neighboring Hunan before once more being [167] suppressed by central government force. Thereafter, the Miao people confined themselves to sporadic raids against the Han Chinese, who steadily advanced into the old tribal territories.[21]

21. Ibid., pp. 190-191.

175 In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, outbreaks of tribal warfare with the Chinese 669 central government occurred further to the 563 south and west. Beginning in 1855, the Moslem 798 population in the Ta-li district of Yunnan staged an uprising against their non-Moslem neighbors that led to almost twenty years of warfare marked by ruthless violence and slaughter on both sides. At least a million people lost their lives in the struggle, and one source estimates the population of the province was reduced from sixteen million to six million.[22]

III. THE MODERN PERIOD

A. The Coming of the West

177 From the middle of the nineteenth century, the Southwest China Region was subject to the intrusion of western military, material, and economic forces. They carried with them new secular and religious ideas incompatible with the traditional cosmological, social, political, and economic views of China. These forces for change coincided with a phenomenon when had been repeated many times over the centuries in China -- the decline of the ruling dynasty with an accompanying abuse of power and growth of disorder.[23]

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22. Cf. Eberhard, op. cit., p. 313; and H. B. Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, 3 vols., London, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1910, 1918, Vol.II, pp. 288-89.

23. The course and effect of Imperial China's

[continued next page]

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The Southwest Region felt the impact of the West later and less profoundly than the regions of China bordering on the Pacicic Ocean. Western military might made an initial impress on the region but was not followed by the broad penetration of new material and ideological forces that changed so much of the environment and thinking in the maritime provinces. The bureaucracy of the Ch'ing Dynasty was succeeded by the warlords of [669] the Republican period. They maintained their power under the Nationalist Government and effectively blocked the wide dissemination of revolutionary doctrine in the Southwestern provinces, while playing along in the power struggle of the twentieth century revolutionary period. Only under the wartime needs and influence of the Nationalist Government in Chungking did the Southwest experience a growth of largely small-scale industrialization, the dissemination of new political and social ideas devoid of revolutionary content, and an advance in direct control by the central political authority.

[Footnote 23 continued]

interaction with the West are described from different points of view in H. B. Morse, op. cit.; and John K. Fairbank and Ssu-yü Teng, China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839-1923, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1954. Unless otherwise noted, the following pages are taken from these sources.

175 of Burma as Chinese territory. Until the out-
636 break of the war of resistance against Japan
563 in 1937, the British t'u-ssu policy in the Burma border area precluded any concerted attempt by the Nationalist Government to exercise real control over the Southwest Region frontier. The same frustration in frontier policy and extension of Chinese authority there still faces the Communist regime, as it has not attempted to enforce by arms its claim to the disputed Burmese area.

175 A chain of circumstances leading to the
635 establishment of Sikang as a separate province
563 within the Chinese administrative system was
669 initiated by the British invasion of Tibet in 1904. The British move was undertaken to offset Russian [illegible] into Tibet during the previous decade, which England believed constituted a threat to its position in India. British occupation was soon followed by direct diplomatic negotiations with Tibet, though China was still recognized as nominal sovereign in the kingdom. At this sign of weakness on the part of the Ch'ing Dynasty, tribal leaders in what was then western Szechwan, and later became eastern Sikang, attempted to revolt. The uprising was quickly put down by a Szechwan army under the command of Chao Erh-feng. He attempted to replace the old t'u-ssu system by instituting hsien government on the Chinese model as a preliminary step to the establishment of a new province to be formed from western Szechwan and eastern Tibet.[25]

25. Ibid., pp. 237-38.

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Tibet asserted its independence during the Chinese revolutionary convulsions of 1912, and with British help maintained a disputed sovereignty until the Communists conquered the territory in 1951. No Chinese government accepted Tibet independence, and intermittent fighting between Tibetan and Szechwan troops continued until 1928. In that year the Nationalist Government was able to assert control over eastern Tibet. That area with western Szechwan was then incorporated into the province of Sikang as part of the Chinese administrative system.[26]

Although the Ch'ing and the Nationalist government policy relieved the t'u-ssu of their legal title to rule, they continued to exercise real command in most of Sikang up to the present time. The last large-scale attempt at revolt by the t'u-ssu occurred in the early nineteen thirties as part of what is known as the Nona Rebellion.[27] The revolt was touched off when Nona, a member of the Commission for the Organization of Sikang Province and high-ranking tribal chieftain, staged an insurrection after the rejection of his recommendation that the t'u-ssu system be restored. His defection led to general unrest among the tribal leaders.

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26. H. B. Morse and H. F. MacNair, Far Eastern International Relations, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1931, pp. 558-62.

27. Wiens, op. cit., p. 246.

175 635 563 669 The revolt was still in progress when the Communists passed through the Southwest Region on their "Long March." Approaching northwestern Szechwan from Yunnan by way of what was then the border area between Szechwan and Sikang, the Communists claim to have had considerable success in winning the friendship of the Lolo (Yi) people.[28] When the Tibetan Autonomous District of Sikang was organized in November 1950, the Communist press reported that fifteen years earlier in the same area the Communists on the Long March had helped the local leaders establish a Tibetan People's Government or Pu-pa.[29] However, a non-Communist study asserts that the t'u-ssu of Szechwan and Sikang feared the Communists more than the Kuomintang and that many of the local leaders were wiped out in desperately resisting the Red Army. This view agrees with the account of the Communists concerning their bitter experiences among the Mantzu tribes of the Lolo people in the extreme northwest of Szechwan and northeastern Sikang during the second stage of the Long March from the Sungp'an area of Szechwan to Yenan in Shensi.[30]

C. Separatism and Conservatism

635 669 175 The rugged terrain of the Southwest Region which had kept it isolated and backward during the

28. See Communist account as reported by Edgar Snow, Red Star over China, New York, Random House, 1938, pp.182-84.

29. S.C.M.P., 39, p. 42.

30. Compare Wiens, op.cit., pp.246-47;and Snow, op. cit., pp. 192-94.

175 imperial era served to perpetuate these conditions
635 during the Republican period that followed. What
669 part the region played in the revolutionary ferment that marked much of China south of the Yangtze River from 1911 to 1928 was characterized by greedy provincialism and military expediency rather than by national aspiration and political idealism.

An immediate and direct cause of the revolution that overthrew the imperial regime was the outbreak in Szechwan during September 1911 of strikes and violence against the central government when it attempted to take over from the province the financing and construction of the Hankow-Szechwan Railway. However, the Chinese do not mark this event as the start of the 1911 Revolution, because the Szechwan outburst was not motivated by anti-dynastic feeling. Rather, the resistance was an outgrowth of jealous provincialism and, apparently, the hope of local investors in the mismanaged and corrupt provincial venture into railway building that the central government could be coerced into replacing their financial losses.[31] When the dynasty showed
175 669 hesitancy in dealing with the Szechwan outbreak, revolutionary politicians elsewhere in China made another and successful bid, after more than a decade of abortive attempts, to establish republican government in China. The premature explosion of a bomb on October 10, 1911 at the Hankow (Hupeh) headquarters

31. On the Szechwan outbreak see Harley F. MacNair, China in Revolution; An Analysis of Politics and Militarism under the Republic, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1931, pp. 28-29.

175 of one group plotting to overthrow the dynasty is
669 celebrated as the beginning of the republican revolution.

Both the outbreak of open warfare between the die-hard revolutionaries and the dynasty, opportunistic militarists in the Southwest Region as elsewhere in China were ready to take advantage of the situation to promote their own interests. Ts'ai Ao (Ts'ai O), a Ch'ing military commander in Yunnan, was the strong man of the Southwest Region. His troops quickly eliminated the Ch'ing adherents in the province and in neighoring Kweichow and Szechwan. As a reward for his contribution to the success of the revolution, he was made military governor of Yunnan under the new republic. A follower of the reformer Liang Ch'i-ch'ao rather than the revolutionist Sun Yat-sen, Ts'ai stood aside in the struggle for power which soon developed between the parliamentary-minded supporters of Sun Yat-sen and the dictatorial-minded president of the republic, Yüan Shih-k'ai. After Yuan had won the battle by dissolving parliament and crushing its adherents' attempt at resistance, Ts'ai was persuaded to move to Peking and take a nominal part in Yüan's increasingly more personalized government. When in 1915 Yüan attempted to cap his dominance of the central government by making himself emperor, Ts'ai fled the capital by way of Japan and returned to Yunnan in December to institute a rebellion that cost his life but eventually forced Yüan to relinquish his ambition and lose his hold on China south of the Yangtze River before he died in June 1916.[32]

32. Ibid., pp. 42-44.

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After Ts'ai's death, his place of leadership and influence in the region and national affairs was aspired to by T'ang Chi-yao, a native of Yunnan and supporter of Sun Yat-sen. Along with other military strong men, he supported the various ephemeral governments established in Canton with Sun's real or nominal leadership between 1918 and 1924. They claimed varying jurisdictions -- always over Kwangtung and Kwangsi, generally over Yunnan and Kweichow, and sometimes over Szechwan and other provinces south of the Yangtze River. On Sun's death following the revitalization and strengthening of the Kuomintang with Soviet Union guidance and material aid, T'ang made a bid for the dead leader's mantle. The Yunnan militarist adopted the title of vice-generalissimo of the Kuomintang armies, a post which had been offered him before Sun's death. T'ang's amibitious move and his command of a combined Yunnan-Kwangsi army posed a threat to the largely Kwangtung military force and leadership of the Kuomintang. Within six weeks of Sun's death, the Yunnan-Kwangsi army was decimated and T'ang forced into retirement.[33]

Thereafter, the Southwest was splintered into petty domains dominated by a number of minor warlords. The influence of the revolution as of the

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33. Ibid., pp. 64-68, 95-96.

175 669 [66] Nationalist Government was scarcely felt in the region. Petty despots forced crop lands to be diverted to the cultivation of opium poppies, levied and collected taxes for decades still to come, and enriched themselves in every way possible at the expense of the lives and property of the people.

175 635 In the 1930's, both Yunnan and Szechwan were brought largely under the control of warlords native to the respective provinces they dominated -- Lung Yün in Yunnan and Liu Hsiang in Szechwan. The foremost native of Kweichow was likewise a military man, Ho Ying-ch'in, who had a major part in running the wartime Chinese army as one of Chiang Kai-shek's most powerful military deputies and still retains some influence in military and civilian affairs on Formosa. Liu Hsiang died as the Nationalist Government removed its capital to Chungking in 1938 and brought new influences to bear in Szechwan. Although there was no love lost between Generalissimo Chiang and Lung Yün, the latter held a major share of his original power in Yunnan throughout the war of resistance against Japan. Two months after V. J-Day, Chiang occupied the warlord's capital of Kunming and incorporated Lung and his army into the national military force. In this capacity, he led his troops into Indo-China to accept the surrender of the Japanese forces there in 1945 and, later, against the Red Army. While pitted against the Communist forces, he fled China to Hong Kong and subsequently returned to the Mainland to serve in the New regime in Southwest China.

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668 were evidently inspired by economic rather than political factors. Enemy bombings and infantry drives against economic objectives, inflation, heavy taxes, and forced delivery of grain quotas to the government at prices far below the open market rate drove farmers and townspeople into bankruptcy, starvation, and desperate measures. After the war, the Nationalist Government was preoccupied with containing or eliminating the Communists while restoring its position in the agriculturally and industrially wealthier, more developed regions of North, Central-South, East and Northeast China. The Southwest was left more to its own devices and the rule of local warlords than was originally planned by the central authorities.

IV. THE RISE AND VICTORY OF COMMUNISM

A. The Long March

668 669 Before the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic, Communism had had a more fleeting existence in Southwest China than in any other region of China. The only period of considerable Communist activity in the Southwest prior to the autumn of 1949 was at the time of the circuitous Long March. The six thousand-mile trek was a Communist retreat from areas of strength in Kiangsi and Fukien to Shensi under constant pressure from Kuomintang air and ground forces.

The first Communist migration occurred in 1933 when Nationalist Government attacks on the

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668 soviets in the Honan-Hupeh-Anhwei border area
669 forced a partial withdrawal of the Communist troops there to Szechwan.[37] They were able to hold on to the naturally defensible northwest corner of the province, and this became the initial goal of the main forces of the Chinese soviets when they were forced to leave their bases in Kiangsi and Fukien under the sledge hammer blows of the Fifth Campaign launched by Chiang Kai-shek in October 1934. The line of retreat for the main body passed through Kweichow, Yunnan, and eastern Sikang.

In these provinces and in Szechwan, the Communists undertook propaganda activities among the Chinese and tribal peoples to gain their good will for the passage of the retreating column of soldiers and civilians. Such acts as the furnishing of arms to the Lolo tribesmen of southwestern Szechwan and eastern Sikang and the distribution of excess captured food supplies to the Chinese peasants all along the route of march helped ease the Communists' way into the Sung-p'an area of Szechwan in July 1935.

While the spent ranks of the new arrivals paused to regain their strength, the Communist leaders argued out future strategy. Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai from the Kiangsi-Fukien soviets insisted that the march be resumed with Shensi as the objective. The leaders of the former Hunan-

37. On the Communist retreat through the Southwest Region see Snow, op. cit., pp.178-194.

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Hupeh-Anhwei force, Chang Kuo-t'ao and Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien, favored remaining at the Szechwan base. Evidently the difference was bound up with a continuing power struggle and could not be resolved. In late August, the main force under Mao and Chou struck north into Shensi. Chang and Hsü with their contingent did not follow until a year later, and then only when driven out of Szechwan by Chiang Kai-shek's armies.

From 1936 until the Red Army invaded the Southwest in 1949, no large-scale Communist movement showed itself in the wartime stronghold of the Nationalist Government. However, a small number of official Communist representatives led by Chou En-lai were stationed at Chungking to maintain liaison with the Kuomintang in the uneasy and mutually expedient alliance between the two armed parties of China during the war of resistance against Japan.

B. Personalities with the Communist Regime

Although the Southwest experienced Communism only briefly before 1949, some of the top men in the Communist regime today derived from Szechwan. Three early converts to Communism from Szechwan are military men -- Chu Teh, Liu Po-ch'eng, and Ch'en I.

The best known and most remarkable of the trio is Chu Teh.[38] Born into a wealthy family,

38. Ibid., pp. 346-55.

669 he was early trained in Western military science
668 and accustomed to luxury and the opium habit. After distinguishing himself as one of Ts'ai Ao's leading generals in 1911 and 1915-16, Chu fell back into the indolent, corrupt life of a warlord-bureaucrat in Yunnan until his habit of reading stirred him into beginning a new life in his late thirties. Forsaking his family and position in Chungking, he broke himself of opium addiction, came under the influence of young leftists and Communists in Shanghai, and travelled and studied in Germany, France, and Moscow before returning to China in 1925. Caught up in the Nationalist Revolution then rising to flood stage, Chu became a full-fledged Communist in 1927 when the split in the Kuomintang-Communist alliance faced him with choosing one side or the other. From 1928 when he joined his forces with those of Mao Tse-tung on the Kiangsi-Hunan border until the end of the Long March in Shensi some seven years later, Chu Teh became a legendary figure in China and in the annals of defensive-guerrilla tactics. Since 1931 he has been commander of the Communist armies, and is now one of the most honored "old comrades" of the Party.

Both Ch'en I and Liu Po-ch'eng joined the Communist Party before Chu Teh, but they did not begin to distinguish themselves until the war of resistance against Japan. Ch'en led the New Fourth Army in the Yangtze River area, while Liu headed the 129th division of the Eighth Route Army in the North China Region. During

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the civil war that followed almost immediately on Japan's surrender, Ch'en I rose to the position of commander of the Third Field Army and Liu Po-ch'eng was promoted to the command of the Second Field Army. The two armies were responsible for the campaigns in the East and Central-South regions, and the Second Army carried the brunt of the attack on the Southwest Region. Ch'en I became a major figure in the East China Region after the Communist victory, and Liu Po-ch'eng assumed various positions of military and civilian leadership in Southwest China.

Another native of Szechwan, Kuo Mo-jo, is one of the leading figures of modern, pre-Communist Chinese literature, journalism, and scholarship. Not a member of the Communist Party as far as is known, Kuo has been heaped with honors by the Communist regime, allowed to travel extensively outside China, and given numerous official positions in the regime's cultural and literary organizations. Originally an advocate of art for art's sake, he became gradually more socially conscious and radical in his literary and journalistic work. Forced to flee to Japan because of his leftist political ideas, he added serious studies in Chinese archeology and ancient history to his long list of writings in poetry, fiction, and political-social polemics.

C. Postwar Victory

By the time the Communist forces entered the Southwest Region in strength, the rest of the Mainland had been overrun and the Communist

regime formally established in Peking.[39] It was November before the Second Field Army under Liu Po-ch'eng launched an attack on Kweichow, taking the provincial capital at Kweiyang on November 15. Chungking in Szechwan fell to the Second Field Army on the last day of the month. During the next few weeks, Liu's forces moved westward toward Chengtu while the Fourth Field Army struck into Szechwan from the north. After Chengtu fell December 27, many of the remaining organized Kuomintang forces surrendered to the Communists in Yunnan and Sikang, and the Communists officially claimed the complete "liberation" of the Southwest Region. However, it is clear that large-scale unorganized resistance continued for a good part of 1950, and isolated bands undoubtedly held out much longer in the rugged mountain areas of the Southwest. It is doubtful, too, whether the Communists have any more real control than had former regimes over the semi-independent tribal areas of the Southwest, especially along its borders with Indo-China and Burma.

The lack of any prolonged organized resistance in the naturally defensible areas of the Southwest Region was the result of several factors. Little faith in the Kuomintang cause remained

39. The names, dates, and campaigns connected with the Communist victory are largely taken from a Communist source, which is accurate in regard to these facts as far as can be determined by checking against other scattered sources: Liao Kai-lung, From Yenan to Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1954, pp. 108-09.

669 among the Nationalist armies and the Chinese
668 people left in the Southwest region. The best Kuomintang troops that could be salvaged from the Communist avalanche had already been withdrawn with the government and its leading officials to Formosa. Other nationalist armed forces retreated into Burma under Li Mi and Yü Ch'eng-wan, living off the Burmese countryside and making occasional harrassing raids into Southwest China for several years until withdrawn to Formosa. Many of the troops and their leaders who surrendered wholesale to the Communists in the Southwest provinces were warlord elements which never had had any commitment, let alone loyalty, to the Nationalist Government.

For the tribal people, the advent of the Communists meant only a change in rulers, with no guarantee that the new overlords would be any more upright or considerate in their dealings with the unassimilated peoples than had been the old Nationalist bureaucracy. The Chinese people of the region were thoroughly sick of warlord exploitation and Nationalist Government corruption. Any regime that promised peace and stability would have been welcomed. To the great majority of the Southwest's population, the peasants, the struggle for power was none of their business. They stood aside waiting for the winner to emerge, and accepted the victory of the Red Army as the beginning of a new dynasty which had inherited the "mandate of heaven" from the discredited Kuomintang.

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III. THE NON-HAN ETHNIC GROUPS

A. The Hui of Yunnan

563 The Hui intermarry with the Han Chinese. When a Han Chinese bachelor desires to marry a Hui girl, he must embrace the Islam[1] faith; a Han Chinese girl who wishes to marry a Hui man does not have to change her own religion. Therefore, although physical difference sets the Hui apart from the Han Chinese, the lack of racial prejudice on the part of the Hui facilitates the assimilation of other groups into the Hui community and renders the racial composition of the Hui more complex. Hence, Hui cohesiveness is attributable to factors other than mere racial physical difference. Their language, religion, and customs that follow religious practice and observance make them cohesive as an ethnic group against outside forces, despite the fact that in Yunnan the Hui do not have large and contiguous communities.

[669] In the past there was enough antagonism between the Hui and the Han Chinese to cause several rebellions against the Chinese government. The bloody suppression of the Hui rebellion led by Tu Wen-hsiu in the middle of the nineteenth century devastated Hui communities in Yunan to such an extent that they have never recovered from it. The Kuomintang government seemed to take for granted that the Hui were so sufficiently assimilated into Chinese communities that they did not merit recognition as a separate ethnic group. In the 1930's

[1] [i.e., the Muslim faith -- Analyst]

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Annex "A," Subparagraph 2b,
Political Background

STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT

I. MILITARY CONQUEST

101 Southwest China was the last region to come under the power of the Chinese Communists.

The term Southwest covers the following provinces: Szechwan, Kweichow, Yunnan, and Sikang. However, Sikang has been incorporated into Szechwan since July 1955.

669 A brief account of the conquest of these four provinces follows. The Communist army began their move toward this region at the beginning of November 1949. This task was entrusted to the 1st Field Army under Peng Te-huai and to the 2nd, under Liu Po-ch'eng. When these two armies were fighting in the provinces of Hupeh and Hunan, they were further reinforced by the 4th army under Lin Piao. While the main force of P'eng's army went ahead for a direct attack of the Northwest Region, a part of his army remained in Shensi to fight the Nationalist army under the command of Hu Tsung-nan, who was withdrawing from Shensi to Szechwan and Sikang.

669 The second field army under Liu Po-ch'eng coming from Shansi and Shensi encountered the Nationalist army on the border of Hupeh, Hunan, and Szechwan. This army was under the command of Sung Hsi-lien, who tried to stop the Communist advance. A battle took place between them, and Liu succeeded in destroying Sung's main force at I-ch'ang and Sha-shih and in crossing the Yangtze River. Liu, not satisfied with this partial success, continued the pursuit of Sung's army to Kweichow and Szechwan.

While Hu Tsung-nan's army was on the way to Chengtu, in the west of Szechwan, it was threatened on both sides: on the northern side by P'eng, and on the southeastern side by Liu. Hu Tsung-nan tried to escape to Ya-an and Hsi-ch'ang, but as Lin's army had already entered Yunnan after the surrender of Governor Lu Han, Liu crossed the border of Yunnan and annihilated Hu's army in Hsi-ch'ang, while Hu himself excaped by plane. Thus the Nationalist Army was completely wiped out.

721 Tibet, which was then a buffer state between China and British India, was still beyond the reach of the Chinese Communists. Liu Po-ch'eng raised the question of Tibet at a meeting of the Southwest Military and Political Committee held on July 27, 1950 and announced that the Tibetan campaign would follow quickly in order to get rid of Anglo-American imperialism. Following this declaration, the Communist Army

423 landowners, and less than 3 per cent in the hands of the middle and poor peasants.[5] He came to the conclusion that as 40,000 people out of a total population of 57,400,000 were on the verge of starvation, the policy of Mao Tse-tung was justified and should be carried out.

745 162 In this period it was also found that there was a large number of persons in Southwest China who depended upon the government for a living. Teng Hsiao-p'ing reported on April 11, 1950 that there were 900,000 disbanded Kuomintang soldiers, 400,000 old civil service men, and 700,000 Communist soldiers. He emphasized that if they were not well-fed, a state of disorder might result.[6] The Communists considered the collection of a grain levy on the whole population in order to feed the armies and the civil service men as the most urgent need at this time.

169 The Communists were greatly concerned that the Kuomintang members would make trouble. Their fears were confirmed when the rebellion led by Li Mi and Yü Ch'eng-wan, two Kuomintang generals, took place in Kunming. Part of the 2nd and 4th field armies were sent from southern Kwangsi to Yunnan, and the rebellion was quickly stamped out, although the rebel leaders succeeded in escaping to the border of Burma.

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5. Ibid., p. 1006.

6. Ibid., p. 991.

625 Other units such as a cadre school, border public security bureaus, and forced labor batallions were also under the department's jurisdiction. Public security bureaus were organized within administrative districts and municipalities. County bureaus were empowered to establish security stations for the strengthening of public security work in ch'ü and hsiang, and they were placed in charge of detention houses and prisons.

B. Public Security in the Rural Areas

625 701 During the land reform period, rural security relied on peasant associations and the militia to enforce decrees and destroy the old rural system, to crush the intelligence agencies controlled by the Kuomintang, to suppress banditry, and to eliminate landlords and "despots."

625 701 669 At the time of the Suppression-of-Counter-revolutionaries Movement in the cities, climaxed by the use of violence in 1951, a similar campaign was carried out in rural areas. Official reports during this time indicated the unrest and the resistance of the peasants, expressed in the forms of organized "underground armies," the killing of militia,

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625 the burning of granaries, and the slaughtering
701 of cattle. Communist authorities in the
669 Southwest China region called for the strengthening of rural public security.[20] Village committees, composed of from 3 to 11 members, were organized, and public security teams were formed.[21]

The extent of rural unrest was indicated by Wen-hui Liu, deputy from the province of Szechwan, at the second session of the National People's Congress.[22] He reported destruction of agricultural implements, sabotage of a dam, murder of Communist cadres and activists, arson, and impairment of relationships between the Han and the minority groups.

In August 1953, bands of armed police were transferred from the military command to the public security agencies in an attempt to strengthen rural public security.

C. Public Security in the Cities

625 The maintenance of public order and

20. New China Daily, June 29, 1952, p. 1, and Oct. 9, 1952, p. 3.
21. People's Daily, Aug. 11, 1952, p. 1.
22. Ibid., July 29, 1955, p. 5.

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Annex "A," Subparagraph 2f,
Political Background

SUBVERSIVE POTENTIALITIES

669 The most serious challenge to the Communist regime immediately after its assumption of power in the Southwest Region was the open resistance of armed groups. The Communists credit the Nationalist Government with having established fifteen guerrilla bases and organized thousands of intelligence workers in Southwest China before evacuating the region. Nearly one million members of Nationalist units and various resistance groups "controlled by the Nationalists," in addition to 80,000 intelligence agents, were reported by the Communiststo have been left behind to harass the new regime.[1]

000 Even after the Communists consolidated

1. Report of Chou Hsing, head of the Department of Public Security of the Southwest China Military and Political Committee, Hsin-hua Jih-pao [New China Daily], Chungking, Nov. 12, 1951, p. 2; and report of Lo Jui-ch'ing, Minister of Public Security, Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Oct. 1, 1951, p. 3.

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I. SUPPRESSION OF COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES

69 The term "counterrevolutionaries" as used by the Communists is only vaguely defined. It includes all persons whose past or present actions are deemed contrary to the purpose and interests of the Communists, particularly "bandits," landlords, armed resistance groups, spies, saboteurs, secret societies, and unrepentant former Nationalist Government officials, army officers, and members of the Kuomintang. Any person to whom the term was applied was generally subject to the penalty of death or forced labor.

A. Extermination of Nationalist Forces and "Bandits"

Prior to 1952, the term "bandits" applied only to remnants of the Nationalist Government forces on the Mainland and long-active bands of robbers, the great majority of which were regarded by the Communists as "agents of Nationalist underground forces." The politically subversive nature of the "bandits" in the Southwest Region was emphasized from the beginning of the Communist attempt to consolidate control there by Liu Po-ch'eng, then chairman of the Southwest China Military and

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF16 SW China
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669 Political Committee and commanding general of the Second Field Army.[3]

669 727 Another factor that contributed to the nature of the "bandit-suppression campaigns" in the Southwest was the large number of Nationalist troops that surrendered to the Communists in this region. The Communists claim they accepted the surrender of 900,000 Nationalist soldiers in Southwest China -- 400,000 of them in organized units and the remainder in scattered groups or as individuals. Part of the captured forces were reorganized and relocated as Communist units, but large numbers were discharged and ordered to their homes. Some of this latter group remained at large to create serious problems for the Communists, including reported participation in open rebellions during 1950 and 1951.

669 725 Communist military campaigns in the Southwest against the remnants of Nationalist

3. Report of Liu Po-ch'eng, Cheng-fu Kung-tso Pao-kao Hui-Pien, 1950, [Compendium of Government Reports 1950], Peking, People's Press, 1951, pp. 989-91.

669 725 forces and robber gangs were conducted in the same manner as in other regions. Elements of the regular Red Army encircled the opposing forces, while Party cadres organized and indoctrinated local militias. The combined Communist forces then cut the opposition into small groups and destroyed the main body of resistance. The mopping up of isolated elements was entrusted to the local militia, permitting large numbers of regular troops to be shifted to pacified rural areas for political work.

669 Within the general pattern of "bandit-suppression" strategy, different timing and tactics were employed in each province to meet the varying conditions encountered by the Communists. The work of eliminating armed resistance in Szechwan was undertaken within four special districts.[4] Counter-revolutionary activity organized by Kuomintang elements and aided by professional bandits, as the Communists described it, seems to have posed the greatest threat in the southern and eastern special districts of Szechwan. Simultaneous campaigns launched during the spring of 1950 in the four special

4. For reports of the work of the four special districts in Szechwan, see Compendium of Government Reports 1950, pp. 1025-70.

669 districts were brought to a close in September with the announcement that 170,000 "bandits" had been eliminated in the southern special district, 120,000 in the eastern district, and lesser numbers in the other two districts.

Pacification of Kweichow was a far more difficult and prolonged problem. The Communists admit that in April 1950 they controlled only the cities and county seats of 48 counties as against 31 counties held by counterrevolutionary forces. Fifteen Nationalist regiments and numerous Nationalist-organized local militias were said to form the backbone of the opposition, which was not overcome until November 1950.[5]

A similar situation confronted the Communists in Yunnan.[6] Many Nationalist troops were identified as taking part in open resistance to the new regime during 1950-51. The situation was complicated by the operation of Nationalist elements along and across

5. On the Kweichow situation, see New China Daily, Oct. 2, 1951, p. 2; Nov. 23, 1951, p. 3.

6. On the Yunnan situation, see People's Daily, Oct. 24, 1950, p. 3; New China Daily, Dec. 17, 1952, p. 1.

1:Stanford U: S-4, 5 1956 AF16 SW China
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669 Yunnan's border with Burma and within ethnic minority areas of the province. In December 1952, the Communists announced the capture of the last Nationalist stronghold inside Yunnan and the annihilation of 21,573 Nationalist soldiers and intelligence agents. However, the presence of Kuomintang forces under Li Mi and Yü Ch'eng-wan across the Yunnan border in Burma constituted a continuous threat to the province's security until they were withdrawn to Formosa in late 1954.

In Sikang, the "bandit-suppression" campaign was on a much smaller scale.[7] It lasted from February to November of 1950 and was reported to have destroyed 30,000 "bandits."

B. Landlords

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668 Under the Land Reform Law and the joint directive of the Government Administration Council and the People's Supreme Court,

7. Compendium of Government Reports, 1950, pp. 1071-73.

668 been entirely eliminated. He called for continued efforts to detect and suppress Nationalist intelligence agents, "bandits," and landlords, and for concentration on the strengthening of the "democratic reform movement" and the establishment of public security committees.

726
669 2. Suppression of Nationalist Spies. The threat of Nationalist expionage in Southwest China was greatest at the time the Communists assumed power in the region. The Communists not only reported 80,000 Nationalist intelligence workers at large in the region, but also claimed their influence and operations extended to the remnants of Nationalist forces, "bandit" units, and secret societies in Southwest China. Great emphasis was placed on the necessity of ridding the region of these spies to assure the well being of the new regime.

During 1950, the Communists concentrated on the disbanding of Nationalist espionage organizations and obtaining the surrender and arrest of spies. In the western Szechwan special district, the Communist authorities reported the surrender of 2,000 spies and the arrest of 318 others in the first half of 1950. During the same period in the southern Szechwan special district,

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726 669 2,451 spies were arrested and 1,200 gave themselves up, according to Communist sources. Throughout the Suppression-of-Counterrevolutionaries Movement in 1951, further efforts were made to apprehend Nationalist intelligence personnel. As one means to this end, the Communists required that all former Kuomintang officials and army officers above the rank of captain register with public security agencies. The officers who complied were placed under surveillance.

Despite the emphasis placed on uncovering spies during the Suppression-of-Counterrevolutionaries Movement, relatively few of the cases dealt with during the campaign involved espionage. In the eastern Szechwan special district, of all prosecuted cases, 79 per cent dealt with "bandits" and "local despots" and only a small percentage concerned intelligence workers.[13]

Counterrevolutionary activities, including Nationalist espionage operations, have received increased publicity since 1954. Three counterrevolutionary cases presented for mass trial in January 1955 at Chungking[14]

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13. Ibid., Dec. 4, 1951, p. 2.
14. People's Daily, Feb. 7, 1955, p. 3.

726 apparently were intended to convince the people
669 that spying by Nationalist agents still constituted an actual threat to the Communist regime. Indeed, it may be that espionage organizations had been revitalized by internal or external forces.

726 3. Foreign "Intelligence Agents."
668 Closely connected with the suppression of
798 Kuomintang intelligence personnel on the Mainland was the apprehension of "foreign intelligence agents." During the 1951 suppression movement, church groups and foreign missionaries were accused of engaging in espionage against the regime. Arrests of missionaries and foreign residents were frequently reported throughout the Southwest Region. A Catholic organization, Sheng-mu Chün (Legion of Mary), was made a particular object of attack. Members of the organization were required to register with the authorities and were subject to investigation by public security agencies. Persons who failed to comply were arrested and charged with counterrevolutionary activity.

687 4. Sabotage. Acts of sabotage reported in the Communist press included the destruction of factory property, the theft of economic information, the spreading of rumors among workers, and the organization of strikes.

2: Rock K-5 (1934-) 1947 AF16 Southwest China AF/6

The finest stand of pine forest in this part of Yün-nan was once here. Trees a hundred feet tall, with perfectly straight boles stood here until the Lo-los came from Ta-liang Shan 大涼山 to settle. Clan feuds had forced them to wander and they came to this wild region. They cleared most of the forests and, cutting down the magnificent hard yellow pines set fire to them as they lay on the ground. Of the smaller twigs and branches they would make oblong piles, cover them with sod, and then burn them; the ashes they ploughed under. This method of agriculture is mentioned in Chinese records about Lo-lo, as ploughing (cultivating) with fire. They made a desert of the land and the smoke clouds of the burning forests enshrouded the landscape (PLATE 93).

Water is scarce, there being only one small water-hole which is dry in winter, while in a small ravine near by a little brook furnished the only regular water supply for the entire community. From here the women carried the water in wooden buckets to their homes. As they depended entirely on rain for irrigation, they grew mainly potatoes, oats and buckwheat. The potatoes they ate baked in live coals. For over ten years they lived here, cultivating the dry lands, until, on account of almost daily robberies they were forced in 1931 to leave Ghügh-t'o. As the area is easily controlled on account of its being surrounded by the Yangtze on all sides, they could never return. Some went to Bbĕr-ddĕr, some to Yung-ning, the Li-chiang soldiers standing by on the banks of the Yangtze until the last Lo-lo had left with wife, child, sheep and pig. Thus they went east and north of the river with their few belongings to find new places to devastate (PLATES 94, 95). In their abandoned fields, young pines have sprouted again.

From Ghügh-t'o, the trail descends into a dry valley and pine forest. Ghügh-t'o like Lo-shui-tung 落水洞, possesses funnel-shaped sink-holes, the narrow part being lined with limestone; they are, however, not so numerous. Ere reaching the hamlet of Mba-yi-wùa one passes a large, forested, limestone mountain called T'khi-t'khi 'a-lv-k'ŏ (To shake off fear at the foot of the cliff) to the east of the trail. It is said that formerly tigers inhabited this region (leopards are still to be found) and people were afraid when they reached that spot.

Diagonally across the hill is a much lower mound, its slopes covered with pines; on its top a mud fort was erected, that is, a simple encircling low, mud wall. This fortification, called La-bpu Wua-ssä, was constructed during the Mohammedan rebellion in 1856, when the Moslems were being slaughtered by the Chinese at Ta-li and elsewhere. As the Chinese officials had fled from Li-chiang, a La-bpu (La-pao) Na-khi headman, by name Wua-ssä, had made himself magistrate and Fu-kuan; he liberated all the prisoners in the jails and slaughtered many Moslems. He forced Li-chiang merchants and well-to-do people, who had lent money to La-bpu peasants at exorbitant rates of interest, to take the place of cattle before a plough, and carry heavy loads. When they were unable to perform such work he addressed them thus: "As you are unable to do the work of a cow ploughing the fields, or to carry a load, you had better drink new milk," and thereupon had them beheaded. By the drinking of new milk he intimated that they had better be killed, to be reborn as babies. Many who had left their old masters, whom they maligned in order to in-

2: Rock K-5 (1934-) 1947 AF16 Southwest China AF/6

669 gratiate themselves with him, and hoped to be enrolled as his followers, were also told that it were better they too "go and drink new milk." For if they were now speaking evil of those whose food they had eaten, would they not probably speak evil also of him after having eaten his? And so saying, he had them beheaded. Nothing is known of the end of Wua-ssä's career.

487 133 137 241 291 301 The Na-khi village of Mba-yi-wùa (H-M., Bayiua; Chinese, Ming-yin-wu 鳴音吾), not far distant from Wua-ssä's fort, is situated on the slopes of a hill at an elevation of 10,160 feet, with cultivated fields surrounding it. Wheat, oats, hemp, rape turnips (*Brassica rapa depressa*), buckwheat and maize are grown by the inhabitants. The village is not a large one and the Na-khi are still more or less uncontaminated. Their women still wear the genuine Na-khi dress, a short, much pleated skirt of greyish-white homespun hemp cloth, with blue borders and horizontal stripes. Heavy silver ear-rings, the size of a large key-ring, with heavy pendants, are inserted into the lobes of the ear, the rings extending below the shoulders (PLATES 96, 97).

The village boasts of a temple situated on the top of the hill over looking it. By far the finest view of the entire snow range is to be had from the temple terrace (PLATE 98). A sunset I once witnessed over twenty years ago from this spot will remain to me unforgettable: As the sun disappeared behind the snowy range, there shone forth magnificent rays above the battlement-like crest, each sharp crag causing the deflection of a ray, while the peaks themselves were enshrouded in cold mist. In the brilliant light of the full moon, shining in a crystal-clear atmosphere, the long snow range resembled a sleeping dragon fashioned of ice.

To the east of Mba-yi-wùa a deep gorge extends towards the Yangtze, called Gyi-t'khi.lo, a branch of which is known as Dto-bpo lo; from here a trail leads into the Yangtze valley, whence several ferries ply across to Yung-ning territory.

The highway north continues over lofty mountains in the center of the loop, first turning west at the village of Mba-yi-wùa, and thence north up a narrow valley through beautiful pine forest, the trees 80 to 100 feet tall, until it comes to a peculiar meadow of great beauty. This is called Nda-za dü or Nda-zaw dü (Land of the descending hoar frost), elevation 10,600 feet. It is peculiar because the meadow is really a basin without an outlet, surrounded by limestone mountains forested with pines; its center, a bog, drains into a little brook or stream which has its source to the north of the meadow. The stream gathers together various brooks and disappears near the foot of the western mountain wall into a hole in the limestone.

From Nda-za dü we climb the eastern hill-side through dense virgin pine forest alive with song birds. To the west of the trail the ravine, which opens into Nda-za dü, narrows and is filled with magnificent spruces (*Picea likiangensis*). Continuing at an elevation of 11,000 feet, we leave the pine forest and enter mixed forest of tall spruces, hemlocks and large oaks, associated with maples, rhododendron, *Dipelta yünnanensis*, etc. This stretch of forest is known as Gka-ts'an-ssu-gka-ts'an. Beyond a few larches make their appearance, also firs, but most numerous of all and by far the stateliest tree of this region, is the Yün-nan hemlock, (*Tsuga yünnanensis*). Alas, the finest part of this forest has been burned, and only the black charred trunks remain, some

& Davies G-5 (1894-1900) 1909 AF16 Southwest China AF16

563 Panthay has become fairly familiar to Europeans from the great Panthay rebellion which was the means of devastating and depopulating Yün-nan from 1854 to 1873, in 563 which latter year it was finally put down. The rebellion 669 began in a quarrel between Chinese and Mahommedan miners, in which the latter thought, probably with reason, that they did not get justice from the Chinese official who investigated the case. The two races are never very friendly, and the Panthays were quite ready to take up arms in hopes of turning Yün-nan or part of Yün-nan into a Mahommedan state where they would be independent of Chinese officials. They had a very good try for it, and for some years they held the greater part of the west of the province, with Ta-li as the capital. Finally the Chinese Government, having, with Gordon's assistance, put down the Taiping rebellion, were able to turn all their forces against the Panthays. Ta-li was taken by the treachery of a Mahommedan officer, and the rebellion brought to an end with the usual slaughter of thousands of the rebels.

The two races naturally hate each other and always will do so, but there is no enmity observable on the outside. A Chinaman and a Mahommedan meeting will always be quite civil to each other. The Mahommedanism of the Panthays is really a very nominal affair, and I do not suppose that Mahommedans so ignorant of their religion could be found anywhere. This ignorance is no doubt partly due to their being isolated among a non-Mahommedan people, but I think also partly to their Chinese origin, for a Chinaman is not by nature a religious man. Though there is doubtless a certain amount of Arab or Tartar blood among the Panthays, they have far more Chinese in them than anything else. I imagine most of their ancestors were Tartars or Turkomans who came into the province with Kublai Khan's armies, but these men must have married Chinese wives. Also many of the present Panthays have their origin from Chinese children who have been adopted by Mahommedans and brought up in that religion. In some cases one can tell a Mahommedan by his features, but very often they are undistinguishable from the Chinese.

563 Along the main road from T'êng-yüeh to Ta-li there

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good many Chinamen living there too, and most of the people appear to talk both languages. They are well known as the biggest blackguards in this part of Yün-nan, and many of them are wanted by the Chinese Government for murders and other crimes, but the country is so little under Chinese control that the officials are not very keen on trying to make arrests. On a subsequent journey I again had trouble at that very town[1], the only place in Yün-nan where I have ever encountered anything like organised opposition. Mêng-hung is in Chên-k'ang territory, but the sawbwa of the latter place finds it more than he can manage and has no real authority there.

The next day we reached Mêng-pun (Möng Pawn), a Shan village of 40 houses, not to be confused with Mêng-p'êng (Möng Hpawng), a somewhat larger place a day's march off W.S.W. In the afternoon a man arrived who had been sent by the Chên-k'ang sawbwa to guide us on to Mang-shih. There had been a good deal of rain lately, and it fell heavily here at night.

The recent fighting from which the warriors I met at Mêng-hung had just returned, was naturally the subject of conversation everywhere in this neighbourhood, and from enquiries made at different places I gathered the following as to its origin. About the year 1890 the late sawbwa of Chên-k'ang was going round his state, and while at the village of Ya-k'ou, which lies two or three marches south-west of the capital, he was murdered by his nephew Tao-lao-wu, who usurped the sawbwaship. He, however, only held it for a few days, as a Chinaman called Ma, who lives on the hills near Hsiao-mêng-t'ung (Möng Htawng), and is one of the principal head-men of the Chên-k'ang state, got some men together, marched on the capital, killed Tao-lao-wu, and dispersed his followers. The present sawbwa, who is the son of the murdered man, and was at that time only two years old, then became the nominal ruler of the state.

Since then the adherents of Tao-lao-wu had been constantly dacoiting in the western part of Chên-k'ang, near the Burmese border. The Chinese authorities accordingly

[1] See p. 136.

• 669 gave orders that the sawbwas of Chên-k'ang, Kêng-ma, and Mêng-ting, were to collect men and combine against the rebels. They seem to have been successful in dispersing them for the time, though I could not hear of much loss of life on either side. This is the story as given me, but, though there is nothing improbable in it, I will not be answerable for its correctness. A Chinaman always has a story to account for any circumstance he may be asked about, with an equally ready answer to any further questions that may be put to him.

133 The next day we continued our journey, crossing a range at 6,800 feet. On the top there are several basins, two of them of considerable size, with villages in them, the water of which has no outlet, the streams running into holes in the hills. In one of these, in which the village of T'ien-pa-chai is situated, the hole is not big enough to take all the water which comes down when the stream is swollen, so that in the rains a small lake is formed where it enters the hill.

On the 2nd May we had a steep bit of down-hill to the Salween, which is here 2,050 feet above sea level. We crossed it at Han-kuai ferry, which is just below the corner where the river begins to make its westerly bend. The Salween is here 120 yards wide with a strong current, and is crossed by one good-sized ferry-boat. The boatmen live at Han-kuai village, which is on the right bank, nearly 2000 feet above the river, up a very steep hill—an inconvenient arrangement for travellers arriving from the east, as they have to wait till the ferrymen choose to come. The usual custom is to fire a gun to attract their attention.

The next day a very hilly march, passing Möng Nawng[1], a small Shan plain with a swampy lake in it, brought us to Pin-ka, a plain five miles long, inhabited by Chinamen and under the jurisdiction of Lung-ling. Two more days of hilly marching in wet weather took us to Hsiang-ta, another little Chinese plain containing about 15 small villages, and on the 6th of May we descended to Möng Hkwan, an important Shan state, called Mang-shih by the Chinese.

The plain is watered by the Nam Hkwan, a tributary

[1] Mêng-nung in Chinese.

5: Davies G-5 (1894-1900) 1909 AF16 Southwest China AF16

wide, but the crossing did not take long, as the large punt-shaped boat would carry 10 mules at a time. 000

This ferry is a good deal used, as nearly all the salt for the Shun-ning and Yün Chou districts comes across here from the wells of Wei-yüan and Chên-yüan. I asked the salt depôt man at the ferry how much salt crossed this ferry in a year. With the usual readiness of a Chinaman he promptly replied, "300,000 mule-loads." "But this would make 800 loads a day all the year round," I ventured to suggest. And as there is no traffic in the rains, he had to acknowledge that he might have slightly over-estimated. From what I saw myself on the road I should think 8000 or 9000 mule-loads a year would be a fair estimate. 317

Salt is a very important article of trade in Yün-nan, as it is a Government monopoly, and none is allowed to be brought into the province from abroad. There are three parts of Yün-nan where salt is obtained. These are (1) Yün-lung Chou, which supplies north-western and a good deal of western Yün-nan, including T'êng-yüeh, Yung-ch'ang, and Ta-li; (2) Wei-yüan, Chên-yüan, and Ching-tung districts and Mo-hei, near P'u-êrh: these wells supply southern and south-eastern Yün-nan; (3) the country north of Ch'u-hsiung Fu: from here is supplied the northern part of the centre of the province, including the capital. The north-eastern corner of Yün-nan, including Tung-ch'uan and Chao-t'ung obtains its salt from Ssŭ-ch'uan province. It is always officially laid down for each district where it is to get its salt from, and none is allowed to be brought from elsewhere.

After crossing the ferry we followed the river down for a little way and then climbed up to the village of T'uan-shan to sleep. We were now in the district of Ching-tung T'ing, but the bit of country round the ferry is in charge of a retired highway robber. A Mahommedan by religion, he naturally sided with his own people in the Panthay rebellion, but towards the end, being a prudent and far-seeing man, he recognised how things were going, and went over to the Chinese side. So zealous did he show himself in the slaying of his former brothers in arms, that the Chinese Government rewarded him by granting him official rank and a small piece of country to rule. Such instances 669

5: Davies G-5 (1894-1900) 1909 AF16 Southwest China AF16

669 of treachery on the Mahommedan side were very common all through the rebellion.

000 After an uphill march on the 18th through jungle and fir woods to the pleasant little hill village of Pai-yin-ch'in, we descended the next day to the Ching-ku Ho, which here runs through a curious valley, so much cut up by wooded spurs and deep sandstone ravines that it can hardly be called a plain. There is scarcely any flat ground, but there are a good many villages scattered along the valley, and the side streams are lined with terraced fields. The country reminds one very much of the upper part of the Shweli River.

245 There is a certain amount of tea grown on the hillsides here, at heights between 4,500 and 5,500 feet in a sandstone soil. It is not considered so good as that produced in the Shan state of Keng Hung, the famous P'u-êrh tea.

136 I shot a woodcock on the march which brought us into the Ching-ku valley. I have occasionally seen this bird in different parts of Yün-nan, and have met with it in May in the Tibetan part of Ssŭ-ch'uan.

000 Our route for the next day and a half still lay down the Ching-ku Ho, but the country is so broken by steep spurs running down to the river, that there is little actual flat going. The river is twice crossed. The first crossing is by a wooden bridge where the stream, though not 20 yards wide, runs in a tremendous chasm between cliffs 200 feet high. These extraordinarily deep ravines are characteristic of this valley.

We reached Wei-yüan on the 21st December, and I found the place in no way changed since my previous visit. From Wei-yüan to P'u-êrh is only four or five marches by the direct road, but I had been along this route in 1895. I therefore struck off in an easterly direction for Hsin-fu, a place near which Turner and Ker had come in to the P'u-êrh-Ta-li road in the previous season. From there by turning south to P'u-êrh I should be able to get in the only part of this important road that had not been surveyed by our parties.

Our route led northward for a day and a half up the Wei-yüan Chiang, along the road to Chên-yüan T'ing, which had been followed by Captain Wingate in 1895. The

of troops to defend the city against a resolute opponent. Sung pan ting has hardly more than 1,500 settled families. Their cloak of protection is therefore far too wide. Inasmuch as there are few Chinese farmers in the vicinity, the city is not required to provide shelter for many refugees in case of a war. This was also a reason why in the 1860s when the Tai ping rebellion weakened the government and the Tibetans and Mohammedans therefore thought their hour of emancipation had come, the city could not offer any resistance against the Tibetan attackers, and rapidly fell. For three years the city, as well as the entire territory up to Nan ping and down to Lung ngan fu and as far as Mao tschou, was ruled by the native aristocrats and the Chinese were so oppressed that to this day they celebrate the anniversary of their emancipation. The day happened to occur during my visit. The Mohammedans also take part in the pleasures of this festival, for they, too, suffered very much under the Tibetans. The latter wanted to re-establish the old kingdom of the Nessedin (Nasding) rgyalbo. The memory of this Tibetan king is still very vivid here.

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The relationship between Chinese and Mohammedans who constitute about half the population of the city, is relatively very good, and that is why there are two Mohammedan prayer halls inside the city wall; and a large mosque has been preserved from ancient times not far from the city across the left bank of the Min ho. As far as other buildings are concerned, we need mention only the old Chen tai yamen in the northern part of the city and the government building of the Ting on a rock terrace in the west. On the periphery of the city are a few lamaistic (Saskya-, Nima-) monasteries. The dwellings /277/ are largely made of wood and many of them are three-storied. A whole section of the city looked very new because just three years before there had been a large fire here. The shops are found along the main street, as everywhere in China. Here one always sees a few Tibetans buying luxury items. The Tibetan population which visits Sung pan ting gives the city a distinctive appearance. The streets are crowded with Ngolok who come riding into the gates on horseback, and above all with hordes of poorly-dressed Bo lo tse or Po lo (Tibetan: Kredyang), men and a surprising number of young women, on foot, and mostly barefoot, clothed only in a coarse, blackish-brown hairy shirt, often without a hat, without any kind of

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133 completely exhausted from constantly breaking through.

On August 26 we rode for only two hours. We saw not a soul anywhere. Not a single wild animal, not even a little fox or an antilope was to be glimpsed in the numerous ravines and gullies. The brook in our valley had become a small river and was 12 meters wide; the valley, too, had constantly grown wider. Our new campsite lay in the Niendorba Plain which showed absolutely no signs of habitation. Not far from it a road track runs due west over a very flat pass. If one follows it, one can in five days reach Ngaba Metsang (Middle Ngaba) with its houses and fruitful fields of loess and its 12 sub-tribe nomads.

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669 Here I asked to be told about the punitive expedition of 1902 against Ngaba. It furnished a whole day's subject of conversation for my companions, for they had all taken part in it. This "war" had also begun in the customary fashion. The chief - with the title of rgyalbo - /285/ of Ngaba Metsang had robbed merchants from Sung pan ting and at their complaint before the ting he had not given up his plunder. He felt so secure in the midst of his barley fields and stone houses that from now on he let himself be addressed as "emperor" (gong ma). Thus the Sung pan yamen, with the approval of the central government, levied troops and sent 800 men up into the Ts'ao ti, under the command of three majors. The troops were apparently well armed and their weapons consisted of newly-acquired Mauser and Hotchkiss guns; but not a man of them had any idea of how to handle the guns. It was not considered necessary to drill the troops, nor did it occur to the officers to let their motley crew, of which only a very few had ever had a gun in their hands, practice a few shots at a target. A few of the Tschang La men had secretly aimed their new weapons at some stones and had for this been given 50 blows in the place that is usually covered with trousers. Again the idea was to proceed in typical Asiatic-Chinese fashion and only bluff. In spite of the poor roads, the gentlemen majors let themselves be carried into the field by their subordinates in sedan chairs. Everything went smoothly until they came within 50 li of Ngaba where they set up a fortified encampment.

The officers thought they could negotiate with Ngaba from their encampment, and when the Ngaba chief did not appear for this, 500 horsemen were sent ahead to invite him. But that is exactly what the Fan tse had been waiting for. They marched into the field, allegedly 1,700 to 2,000 men strong. Their horsemen were dressed in coats of mail and thickly padded jackets which gave very good protection against ordinary bullets. The Chinese horsemen who were supposed to fetch the chieftain and who had been told as a matter of encouragement

that their new guns carried 10 to 20 li, began firing at 3 li without, of course, wounding even a single opponent, for no one had told them a word about aiming, etc. The 30 cartridges which each of them carried were soon used up and when they had only empty guns in their hands the cuirassiers came storming up. A large number of Chinese, among them an officer, were captured, a captain and 21 men were killed. The Chinese fled back to China in disbandment without, however, being annoyed by the Fan tse. The prisoners were also sent home after four days. In the following year (1903) 1,500 Chinese were called to arms. This time, however, they marched via Merge and not via the Gari li. Not far from the Merge monastery I saw the remains of the fortified fixed quarters. At the request of the officers, the tschümsad of the Merge gomba intervened and succeeded in making peace within a few months. The chieftain of Ngaba Metsâng paid 200 taels for every dead Chinese and 300 for the captain. However, there was nothing to be done about the tea that had been stolen because it was already drunk up. This success was possible because the Tibetans were not united among themselves. Ngaba Metsâng had meanwhile become hostile with Ngaba Tsenda and had to be prepared for an attack in the rear by the latter because it had "eaten" Chinese money.

Our battle with the swamps of the Re Chu was extremely tiring. The rain continued and at times made the mapping-out of the country almost illusory. Every little lateral valley was filled with a bog. The two scouts who were supposed to discover the best passage for the horsemen and pack horses that followed, were constantly stuck in a mire. Often for long stretches horse and rider sank knee-deep into the swamp at every step. But the tsung ye goaded them on without ceasing. I had never seen such a nervous person and one who was in such a hurry. There was not a day's march that was long enough for him and every time we stopped for tea he brought me his gun and asked whether it was still in order - which was quite justified, for the poor man could not ride, had never before been out in wet weather and was therefore the one who was most frequently stuck in a mud puddle and got sand and mud into his gun barrel, even though, like all brave Chinese soldiers of that time, he had a thick stopper in the muzzle of his loaded gun.

/286/ Below the Niendorba plain the Re Chu Valley became narrower. The floor of the valley was still boggy. It led due north. On the twenty-sixth during our march we saw a rider. My Ba tsung who had ridden ahead as scout came dashing back, crying: "The